This monograph is the third in the series of monographs stemming from the Strategic Studies Institute- U.S. State Department conference on Russia in January 2010. It is devoted to a consideration of Russia's military doctrine. Russia had long before the conference announced the impending release of a new defense or military doctrine, but its release date was always being delayed, signifying a sharp political struggle over its contents. Although the doctrine ultimately was released on February 5, 2010, after the conference, the papers were nonetheless able to some degree to use the new text in their analysis. As a result, these three chapters provide an extremely revealing examination of the struggles over defining the threats facing Russia and the responses that the government should take to meet them. These struggles, as delineated here, provide deep insight into the nature of Russian security and military politics and the evolving views of key military and governmental institutions. No understanding of contemporary Russian defense and overall security policy is truly complete without taking into account the "backstage" politics described here. Neither is the doctrine entirely comprehensible without the kind of analysis that is offered.